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1. Introduction
Cities are important in the governance of environmental politics in
general, as well as for the accomplishment of goals of low-emission
mobility (Betsill and Bulkeley, 2007; Banister, 2008; European Union,
2016). However, despite the increased attention to the issue of sus-
tainable urban mobility, transport policy research is criticised for its
lack of attention to power, context, resources and legitimacy (Marsden
and Reardon, 2017). This paper addresses these issues, by examining a
current example of governance for sustainable transport, namely the
Norwegian goals and strategies for zero growth of car traffic, im-
plemented through multilevel urban contracts. The latter are the so-
called ‘urban-growth agreements’ (UGAs),1 being incentive arrange-
ments involving network cooperation between national, county and
municipal authorities on transport and land-use policies for the larger
urban regions.
In many ways, UGAs are a continuation of the former toll-road
packages. Transport-infrastructure projects in Norwegian cities have
long been financed via toll rings. Over time, the funds have increasingly
been used for developing infrastructure underpinning sustainable
transport, such as public transport, cycling and walking. The UGAs
exemplify this, although they also allocate resources for road building.
The UGAs have been promoted as a major tool for achieving the so-
called Zero-growth Goal (ZGG). Launched in 2012, this proclaims that
all growth in person transport in the larger urban areas is to be ab-
sorbed by public transport, bicycling and walking (Ministry of
Environment, 2012). Through the UGAs, all three levels of government
must implement measures and policy in line with the ZGG. The national
government grants 50% of the investment costs for large infrastructure
projects, with the county and municipal contribution mainly covered by
toll-road payment. Goal achievement is monitored with indicators, in-
cluding travel surveys, traffic indexes and land-use indicators.
This paper analyses UGAs with a focus on the design of the goals
and agreements, assessing how they promote climate-friendly trans-
port. Empirically, the paper builds on an exploration of three current
agreements being the empirical cases—the Oslo, Trondheim and
Stavanger UGAs,2 Theoretically, the study applies a metagovernance
framework and discusses the ways the national level seeks to influence
local land-use and transport policy, but also how the UGAs open for
municipal and county authorities influencing decision-making at the
national level. Especially, we consider how national authorities design a
policy goal (here, the ZGG) and the supporting governance structures
(UGAs). We analyse the policy design and implementation in the dis-
course on metagovernance and ask the following main research ques-
tion: To what extent are the Norwegian ZGG and UGAs designed and co-
ordinated in ways that promote climate-friendly transport?
UGAs involve both a policy package of measures and network-
governance structure. Further, it is characterised by national authorities
monitoring local-level development through selected indicators. The
UGA arrangement recalls interventions and schemes in previous re-
search concerning climate-change experimentation. Bulkeley et al.
(2015, p. 18) described urban experimentation as ‘integral to the gov-
erning of climate change in cities’. In our view, UGAs and the ZGG
should also be considered experimentation, but not primarily at the
urban level. In terms of metagovernance, they illustrate how the state
could act to motivate cities and regions to achieve national policy goals.
This paper contributes to the literature in four main ways. First, it
responds to the call for ‘on-the-ground’ policy analysis (Marsden and
Reardon, 2017), highlighting how meta policy is transferred to local-
level action. Second, it explores experimentation beyond the strictly
urban level by adding a metagovernance perspective. Third, it eluci-
dates metagovernance processes by highlighting the geographical
characteristics of contractual agreements and power relations between
the network actors. Fourth, it applies two of Sørensen and Torfing's
(2009) theoretical metagovernance tools, network framing and network
design, to multilevel contract-based cooperation. The analysis is
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structured using three dimensions, or fields, viewed as central in the
metagovernance of contractual agreements like UGAs, namely, goal
operationalisation (network framing), scope (network design) and
participation (network design). These are relevant in the analysis of the
UGAs' potential to serve the national ZGG. They are also suitable for
illustrating elements of state-level decision making and the balancing of
different needs in land-use and transport-system development.
2. Theoretical perspectives
The study finds its main inspiration in governance literature. The
concept of governance refers to situations where ‘decision making and
implementation take place in networks of public, private and semi-
private actors’ (Edelenbos et al., 2010, p. 46). While this collaboration
is based on interdependence, negotiations and trust, the notion of
‘governance without government’ (Rhodes, 1996) has been criticised
for ignoring the still strong role of government (Hill and Lynn, 2005;
Baker and Stoker, 2011; Torfing and Sørensen, 2014; Capano et al.,
2015). The government's role has been adapted to more complex, ra-
pidly changing environments (Capano et al., 2015; Torfing, 2016).
Thus, ‘soft’, nonbinding, flexible governing tools are used rather than
‘hard’ tools that are fixed and legally binding (Vabo and Røiseland,
2012; Blomqvist, 2016).
Our work builds on insights from earlier studies focussing on mul-
tilevel-governance networks, which has been discussed as a common
mechanism for national governments to solve complex or ‘wicked’
problems (Tompkins and Adger, 2005; Bulkeley, 2005; Bulkeley and
Betsill, 2005; Amundsen et al., 2010) and influence local processes
(Hovik and Hanssen, 2015). Exemplifying the latter, Marsden et al.
(2009) find increased attention among English municipal-authority
transport planning departments on the quality of their planning fol-
lowing the implementation of a national performance-reward scheme.
In this context, we also find previous literature on meta-policy to be of
high relevance. O'Toole (2004) argues that sustainable development is a
meta-policy ‘guid[ing] the development of numerous more specific policies’
(p. 38). While the ZGG is not as broad as sustainable development is,
this paper treats it as a type of meta-policy applied for guiding the
development of more specific policies. To Bache et al. (2015), this
translation of policy objectives into more specific measures on the
ground is essential for preventing meta-policy from becoming symbolic
and toothless locally. They suggest the need for identifying an inter-
vening stage between ‘objectives’ and ‘settings’.
Theoretical perspectives on policy goals are useful for under-
standing multilevel governance, as it describes how goal formulations
at one level relates to reception on another. It should be noted that our
analysis of UGAs is focused on the design of this new policy and gov-
ernance approach. It was beyond the scope of the study to involve any
measure of the actual effectiveness of it (in terms of results on car-use
etc). However, we will consider aspects of effective goal setting. Jung
(2012) describes the differences between goal-setting and goal-ambi-
guity theory: In the former, effective goal setting potentially contributes
to employees’ affective response and organisational performance. The
goals are clearly specified and of reasonable difficulty. In contrast, goal
ambiguity describes situations where the goals are less clear.
A concept that we have drawn particularly on in the framing of our
work is the type of network steering referred to as metagovernance—the
‘governance of governance’ (e.g. Sørensen and Torfing, 2009). Jessop
(2004, 2016) views metagovernance as a key state activity for securing
coherence among governance regimes and providing an appropriate
balance between different actors. To be specified though, is that our
approach means that not all network partners may have equal power or
the same roles (c.f. Torfing et al., 2009). Moreover, we acknowledge the
challenges relating to metagovernance through networks. For instance,
Torfing (2016) have discussed dilemmas related to inclusion versus
exclusion of actors in the network. Having many participants may
hinder efficient solutions, while having few participants is less demo-
cratically inclusive. This dilemma has been identified in empirical
studies of urban networks (e.g. Tønnesen, 2015a). It is further ac-
knowledged in that ‘open and inclusive governance networks tend to
‘enhance democracy to the detriment of effectivity’ (Sørensen and Torfing,
2009, p. 253), but a potential loss in effectiveness is acceptable to many
owing to the undemocratic character of closed, club-like networks.
Moreover, Torfing (2016) highlights the overall normative objective
of the network in pursuing and defining the arrangement's scope. The
objectives and scope must be reasonably effective in serving a societal
need and reasonably implementable. Extensive policy packages are in
danger of collapsing due to their complexity (e.g. Petterson, 2014).
Previous research also notes that there is a sensitive balance be-
tween different policy objectives of networks. For instance, environ-
mental policy may be de-prioritised compared with economic growth
(Bache et al., 2015; Lafferty and Hovden, 2003). To reduce im-
plementation barriers, there is a need for identifying and handling the
close connections between environmental policymaking and manage-
ment of local economies (Tønnesen, 2015b).
Sørensen and Torfing (2009) identify four metagovernance tools;
including two hands-on and two hands-off instruments. We focus on the
hands-off tools, network framing and network design. Network framing
implies influencing the network's political goals, fiscal conditions, legal
basis and discursive storyline. Metagovernance through network design
involves influencing scope, character, composition and institutional
procedures of the networks. While there are overlaps, network framing
can be seen as more overarching. This analysis is structured via the
following three dimensions, which are central in the metagovernance of
contractual agreements like the UGAs:
• Goal operationalisation, which is related to network framing,
especially how the ZGG is operationalised in the UGAs (see section
5.1);• Scope, which is related to network design, focussing on which pro-
cesses and measures are placed inside and outside the UGA ar-
rangement (see section 5.2); and• Participation, which is also related to network design and involves
the variation in governance structures with different representations
of county and municipality authorities in the three UGAs (see sec-
tion 5.3).
Focussing on hands-off instruments does not suggest that they are
more relevant than the hands-on ones in the UGAs. The choice rests on
the need for demarcation: Hands-off instruments are best suited to
frame the paper's empirical material. Concerning Sørensen and Torfing
(2005) hands-on instruments, network management attempts to reduce
tensions, resolve conflicts, empower actors and lower transaction costs
through different kinds of material and immaterial inputs and re-
sources. One example is national authorities providing reports and
statistics as a foundation for decision making in the UGAs. The second
type of hands-on instrument is network participation,3 which influences
the policy agenda, range of feasible options, premises for decision
Nomenclature
GHG Greenhouse gas
LW region Living and working region
UGA Urban-growth agreement
ZGG Zero-growth Goal
3 Note that this category, network participation, describes national autho-
rities' involvement in the networks, while our constructed category above,
Participation, involves representations of county and municipality authorities
in the UGA's.
A. Tønnesen, et al. Transport Policy 81 (2019) 35–44
36
making and negotiated policy outputs. An example is the national au-
thority's positioning as leader of the political steering groups in the
UGAs.
3. Contextual background
3.1. National legislative and administrative framework
In Norway, municipalities employ formal tools influencing land-use
and transport patterns. Important decision-making power has been
delegated to municipal authorities. The counties provide public trans-
port services and coordinating regional planning. Thus, national en-
vironmental ambitions are highly connected to municipal- and county-
level policy. However, the national Planning and Building Act contains
requirements aiming for consistency between local activity and state
policy, including the demand for municipal planning to follow nation-
ally defined goals. In addition, urban regions depend on national au-
thorities for transport-infrastructure investments, as the cost is too high
for local or regional actors to cover alone. The three levels of govern-
ment have different responsibilities in urban transport planning. The
municipality is responsible for urban development, municipal roads,
parking and land-use planning. The county is responsible for county
roads, public transport and regional development, with their responsi-
bility for regional transport and land use plans being central. The state
oversees national roads and rail. A political commitment on the mu-
nicipal and county levels is required to introduce or make changes to
toll-road payment schemes, which must be accepted in Parliament.
3.2. The ZGG and UGA structure
To achieve the ZGG, Norway's urban regions must avoid increases in
total person-car driving length. The UGAs were launched as a main tool
to accomplish this (Ministry of Transport, 2017). The UGA structure is
currently open to nine larger urban areas, and by 2019, the largest four
have signed (the Oslo, Bergen, Trondheim and Stavanger regions). The
UGAs have a duration of about 7 years, but allow renegotiations. In
2018 renegotiations started and in March 2019, the Trondheim area
was the first to enter a second UGA.
For 2018–2029, national authorities have allocated almost €7 bil-
lion to municipalities and counties.4 Funding for transport development
is obtained through toll rings by merging the UGAs into existing re-
gional transport-policy packages based on toll-road schemes. The main
UGA projects involve public-transport infrastructure (bus rapid trans-
port in Stavanger and Trondheim and a new metro line in Oslo), im-
provements to public transport services, improvements for walkers and
cyclists and road-infrastructure improvements. While some larger pro-
jects are specified in the documents, priorities are determined through
portfolio management; the sequence of measures is flexible based on
cost, financing or ability to reach the ZGG, representing a central issue.
An illustration by the national road authority explains how the
packages of measures may differ between the urban regions (Fig. 1).
However, one measure is fixed: All the UGAs require strengthened toll-
road schemes to access the resources needed for the large-scale UGA
projects. There has been a degree of lack of clarity in terms of the re-
sponsibility of effectuating new toll-schemes. As the Norwegian prime
minister noted, ‘Toll-road payment results from locally based decisions, but
it is the Parliament that has decided that we should have zero growth in car
traffic. When municipalities choose toll roads as financing, then this is up to
them’.5 As will be returned to, the toll-road dimension of the UGA has
been at the heart of local resistance.
The UGAs also address land-use development, emphasising that all
three levels of government have requirements for acting according to
regional land-use plans. The parties have a shared commitment to
achieving the ZGG, which involves the promotion of compact land use
and location of new development in areas where there are beneficial
conditions for minimising car usage. Municipally, it can involve car-
restrictive measures, such as increased parking fees or a reduced
number of parking lots.
To monitor local-level development, an extensive indicator set has
been established, including yearly travel-behaviour surveys. The
agreements do not specify local measures, but the parties are expected
to implement stronger measures if ZGG seems unlikely to be reached. If
the parties fail to fulfil their obligations, funding may be held back. This
system has some similarities with an English performance-reward
scheme, where the central government can adjust the funding by up to
25% based on the quality of the plans and goal achievement (Marsden
et al., 2009).
In the Norwegian UGAs, lack of goal achievement may also influ-
ence state financing in the later rounds of renegotiated UGAs. Thus, the
arrangement is in line with the principle of national authorities ‘gov-
erning at a distance’ (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2004), illustrating the re-
levance of a metagovernance perspective. While the shared obligation
between the parties is emphasised (Ministry of Transport, 2017), the
state still has a clear metagovernance role. As a public officer in the
Municipality of Trondheim stated, ‘[T]here is no doubt that the state is the
heavyweight’.6
3.3. The three urban regions included in the study
The Oslo region, entering its UGA in 2017, is the largest in Norway,
located in the southeast of the country (Fig. 2). The main urban ag-
glomeration is the capital, Oslo, with 673 500 inhabitants. In the
functional living and working (LW) region, there are 1 354 500 in-
habitants, with Baerum being the second most populous municipality
(125 500). The Stavanger region, also entering its UGA in 2017, is
located on the west coast. There are two municipalities forming a
continuous urban area, Stavanger (133 000) and Sandnes (76 500), and
there are 340 500 inhabitants in the LW region. Finally, the Trondheim
region is located in the middle of the country. Here, Trondheim is the
largest municipality (193 500 inhabitants), followed by Stjørdal
(24 000). There are 282 500 inhabitants in the LW region. The
Trondheim region was the first to enter a UGA in 2016, and it es-
tablished the first (and currently only) second UGA in 2019.
4. Methodology
There are currently four Norwegian UGAs. Due to time and budget
limitations, we have chosen to study three—Oslo, Trondheim and
Stavanger. The fourth UGA, that of Bergen, was excluded because of its
many similarities with the Trondheim UGA.7 By choosing the three
UGAs as cases, variations regarding their multilevel governance struc-
tures emerged (cf. Flyvbjerg, 2011; see section 5.3).
The data collection was carried out via document studies and qua-
litative interviews. The document studies comprised the signed UGAs,
minutes from negotiation meetings, minutes from UGA steering-group
meetings and policy documents. The interviews played a key role, since
collecting policy actors’ personal assessments of the processes and the
agreements in general gave us rich insights about the work with UGAs
in practice. A purposive sampling strategy was employed (Lynch,
2013), which not only included actors close to the process but also
4 The sum also includes a smaller adjoining arrangement called the Reward
Programme, not discussed here.
5 Newspaper article in VG published online (09/09/2018).
6 Informant quotations and policy document extracts have been translated
from Norwegian.
7 The choice of Trondheim over Bergen rests upon the former urban region
being a forerunner in terms of being the first to enter both a first and second
UGA.
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those indirectly involved or potentially affected. We interviewed poli-
ticians, county- and municipal-authority representatives (for the latter
both core city and surrounding municipalities), public-transport actors
and local business-association representatives. We sought to interview
the same types of informants for the three UGA cases; However, due to
differences between the urban regions and their governance structures,
the number and type of informants were not completely equal. We also
interviewed state-level representatives from the national road authority
and two ministries. The interviewees were actors holding key positions
in establishing and administrating the UGAs and more indirectly in-
volved actors.
A (semi-structured) interview guide was developed. Thirty-seven
face-to-face interviews were conducted (in 2017). To cover the UGA
renegotiation processes, four follow-up interviews were conducted with
interviewees from the first round (February/March 2019). The parti-
cipants were guaranteed anonymity; with the informants’ permission,
the interviews were recorded. They were then fully transcribed, and the
transcripts were loaded into NVivo, a software program for qualitative
analysis. The material was coded and analysed according to a set of
defined categories.
5. Three relevant fields for UGA metagovernance
5.1. Operationalisation of the ZGG: network framing
The UGA does not have a goal-hierarchy structure; the agreements
aim to reach the national ZGG - that all growth in person transport in
urban areas is to be absorbed by public transport, bicycling and walking
(Ministry of Environment, 2012). This goal is considered to serve
multiple purposes. According to a state-level informant, ‘There hasn't
been a goal structure established, with sub-goals jointly pointing toward a
main goal [in the UGA arrangement]. Instead, it has been announced that if
one manages to achieve the Zero-growth Goal, one will manage everything’.
Municipalities may also have more ambitious local goals. Oslo for ex-
ample, seeks a 36% reduction in greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions (all
sectors) and 20% reduction in car traffic by 2020. However, while the
Oslo goal proclaims transport reduction, the ZGG involves not only the
core city of Oslo but also the larger urban region (see 5.3). Thus, it
differs from other Norwegian transport goals by both not setting a
‘reduction number’ (for e.g. car-use reduction or GHG emission level)
and by including the core city and its surroundings. Thus, the UGA is
lifted above the traditional showcasing exercise of cities presenting
ambitious climate policy goals to reach within their own municipal
borders (Gustavsson and Elander, 2012; Isaksson et al., 2017). Handling
the different contexts and distinctions relating to land-use and transport
policy in the wider urban region is another matter. Hence, central to the
ZGG ambition is how it is set to cover the wider urban area. Last, the
ZGG differs from other Norwegian transport goals by being tightly
connected to population growth, which varies substantially between
the urban regions. All else being equal, it will be harder for an urban
region with strong rather than weak population growth to reach the
ZGG.
Many informants related the short-term success of the ZGG, un-
derstood as its widespread integration in national, county and muni-
cipal plans, to politicians' and public officials' view that it was under-
standable and politically manageable. However, this does not
necessarily mean that the goal will be effective; moreover, the most
effective measures are often the hardest to implement (Rist, 1998; van
der Doelen, 1998; Givoni et al., 2013; Givoni, 2014). While most in-
formants applauded the ZGG, some emphasised the difference between
zero growth and car-use reduction. Noting that the Stavanger region
has the highest car share among the largest Norwegian regions, one
state-level informant asked, ‘Why should they be allowed to drive as many
cars in the future as they have in the past?’
Another characteristic of the ZGG is its orientation towards vehicles'
driving distance in the urban areas. According to the goal, the number
of kilometres driven using private cars should not increase regardless of
whether growth occurs for electric or fossil-based cars. This is of
especial relevance in the Norwegian context, with its high and in-
creasing levels of electric-car usage. By 2018, there were 142 000
electric vehicles, representing 43% growth from 2017 (Statistics
Norway, 2018a). Thus, strong growth in electric-car usage could hinder
the UGA regions from reaching the ZGG, although fossil-car usage is
kept at bay. This illustrates how the ZGG not only relates to climate
issues, but also addresses traffic-flow issues, hereunder the avoidance of
congestion. Hence, it is only ‘in part a goal for reducing climate gas
emissions’ (Ministry of Transport, 2017, p. 146, own emphasis). This
orientation potentially reduces the chances of incentivising for electric-
car usage, but the ZGG may have broader relevance and durability from
this perspective. While GHG emissions from cars may drop due to in-
novations in engines or fuel, the ZGG may still be relevant for reducing
other negative externalities from urban car usage. As noted in the na-
tional transport plan, ‘Zero- or low-emission cars use as much road space
and parking capacity as diesel and gasoline cars and contribute to conges-
tion, accidents, noise and particulate matter’ (Ministry of Transport, 2017,
p. 147).
A final feature of the ZGG is its focus on personal transport. Freight
transport is not included due to a desire to facilitate service provision
Fig. 1. Three hypothetical packages of measures, il-
lustrating the degree of local flexibility. Explanation;
blue - car-usage cost (e.g. toll road), white - car-use
regulation (e.g. reduced access to car-parking), grey
– public transport facilities, orange – walking and
cycling facilities, green – land use regulation (e.g.
urban densification). Source: Norwegian Public
Roads Administration. (For interpretation of the re-
ferences to colour in this figure legend, the reader is
referred to the Web version of this article.)
Fig. 2. Locations of the three urban regions.
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and ensure good conditions for the business sector (Ministry of
Transport, 2017). In Norway, road freight transport is expected to
double toward 2050 (Hovi et al., 2017), and a lack of local goals and
visions for urban logistics has been noted (Fossheim et al., 2017). Thus,
a situation could occur where the UGA cities fulfil the ZGG but still
experience ever-increasing volumes of freight transport. As defined and
operationalised, the ZGG and UGAs do not seem set to become driving
forces for innovative urban logistics. As one county-level officer in the
Trondheim region stated, ‘I definitely think that reports on freight
transport need to be included [in the UGA arrangement]. Because what
you don't measure, you won't focus on […] If we solve the situation with
private cars now, we will still have an enormous stream, and a growing
stream, of freight cars'.
5.1.1. Discussion: the dimension of goal operationalisation
The concern about the ZGG and UGAs not highlighting urban freight
is understandable. Freight is central to a range of urban challenges, and
the UGAs seems unlikely to address this. The challenge echoes Marsden
et al.’s (2009) remark on the potential negative effects of performance
rewards in the transport sector: ‘Whilst the system appears to offer benefits
of enhanced performance on defined indicators, this may lead to imbalances
in priorities between those things for which performance is rewarded and
those for which it is not’ (p. 66).
On the other hand, one reason for the good reception of the ZGG
may be that it is perceived as manageable, in line with goal-setting
theory (see Jung, 2012, and section 2) emphasising the mobilizing ef-
fects of goals being specific and reasonable difficult. Still, it is unclear
whether actors fully comprehend what it requires to have zero growth
in an urban region experiencing population growth.
The ZGG is simultaneously a narrow and wide goal. The narrowness
is found in its focus on person transport and driving lengths. It is the
total driving length of private cars in urban areas that is targeted, re-
gardless of the emission type. However, this operationalisation may
secure the goal's broader relevance and durability, as addressing levels
of person car usage reduces other negative externalities. Thus, the ZGG
can have positive implications for a range of urban challenges.
As described in section 2, the ZGG is a meta-policy to be translated
into specific measures locally. National authorities allow for different
combinations of policy measures given that the package is considered to
lead in direction of zero growth. Thus, the weighting between measures
differs in the Norwegian UGAs to allow municipal actors to adjust their
policies to the local context. However, as described in section 5.3, the
shaping of toll-road schemes is more restricted, causing tension be-
tween the state and municipalities. Further, while the packages may
have some local flexibility, tension could arise if the UGA indicators
suggest a lack of goal achievement. The UGAs state that this would
require the implementation of counter-measures and a strategy shift.
This is in line with the national government's tendency to become more
‘local’ (Bouckaert and Kuhlmann, 2016), with more freedom at the local
level often being met by performance indicator systems, regulations
and standards (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2004; Tranvik and Fimreite,
2006).
5.2. Demarcation of the UGA scope: network design
Land-use and transport-system development are extensive policy
fields. Hence, in structures like UGAs, some aspects will be defined as
within the scope of the agreements, while others will remain outside.
These choices will influence the UGAs' complexity and potential for
changing transport patterns. As described above, the characteristics and
operationalisation of the ZGG have implications for the UGAs’ scope, as
do institutional conditions at the state level. This is especially evident in
the Trondheim region, where there were tensions between the muni-
cipal and county levels on one side and the state on the other con-
cerning the expansion of a main road link between Trondheim and the
second largest city in the area, Stjørdal. While the municipality and
county wanted improved railroad facilities first, the state prioritised the
new road. In other words, expecting municipal and county authorities
to target zero growth, the state simultaneously decided to build massive
road infrastructure that will likely reduce the chances of reaching the
ZGG, frustrating municipal- and county-level informants:
It is an especial challenge that the E6 road towards the east,
Trondheim–Stjørdal, is going to be four lanes […]. It was a [municipal]
political wish to first build double railroad tracks between Trondheim
and Stjørdal […] to reach the ZGG […]. The more cars a road stretch
attracts, the higher the score it will obtain in the socioeconomic calcu-
lations [giving high a rank in the New Roads agency system]. That is
exactly what we don't want: […] more person cars on the E6 road be-
tween Trondheim and Stjørdal. (Public officer, Municipality of
Trondheim)
The road project illustrates a well-known tension between whether
to facilitate or restrict car usage in urban areas. The UGA aims for ZGG,
while increased traffic efficiency through road-capacity expansion is
simultaneously being targeted. How this relates to state-level frag-
mentation is illustrated by the abovementioned road project in the
Trondheim region; In 2015, a new state agency called New Roads was
established to optimise Norwegian road building by reducing cost,
streamlining planning processes and prioritising projects with high
expected economic benefits. The agency was given the responsibility for
a set of road plans. Among these were the road stretch between
Trondheim and Stjørdal, which scored high on anticipated profitability.
The new agency was not part of the UGA governance network, nor did
the ZGG seem to be an integral part of their scheme for evaluating the
road projects. In the parliamentary document in which the plans for the
road expansion are anchored, the only references to the ZGG and UGA
are found in descriptions of the local political handling of Trondheim
municipality (Ministry of Transport, 2018). Here, Trondheim munici-
pality states, ‘If governmental initiatives challenge the [ZGG], the state must
also take responsibility for implementing measures. […] The city council will
clarify the state's responsibility for mitigating measures in the [UGA re-
negotiations]’ (p. 10).
For a long time, the discussion in the Trondheim UGA centred on
whether induced traffic resulting from the road-capacity expansion
should be included in the traffic counts used to indicate its goal fulfil-
ment. In the end, railroad improvements were set as a main measure for
countering the new road's traffic-inducing effects. The result is evident
in the new UGA, where emphasis on improved railroad services is clear
(Trondheim UGA, 2019). Thus, the UGA potentially activates a me-
chanism where the state will compensate state-measures working
against the ZGG.
Scope is also relevant for localisation debates. In line with research
acknowledging the close connections between land use and transport
emissions (e.g. Næss, 2006, 2012; Banister, 2011; Tennøy, 2012), na-
tional authorities have established guidelines emphasising localisation
of visitor-intensive functions in central areas and near public-transport
hubs (Ministry of Local Government and Modernisation, 2017). For the
Stavanger region, the UGA states that localisation of visitor-oriented
state enterprises needs to follow the national guidelines (Stavanger
UGA, 2017). However, simultaneously with the Stavanger UGA ne-
gotiations in 2016–2017, there was also another issue arising—where
to locate the new regional hospital. With an estimated 7670 workers
and 966 420 visitors per year (Tennøy et al., 2017), this decision has
large transport consequences, as the decided locality on a hilltop in the
urban outskirts does not seem to enhance ZGG attainment. Among our
informants, there were split opinions on the desirability of this location,
much in line with the different professional perspectives. Complex
needs are balanced in situating hospitals; as a Stavanger-municipality
politician illustrated, ‘The new locality is the worst solution in terms of
transport […], but because the hospital wants it that way, the health policy
in it, transport arguments lose’. The new hospital will likely become a
rather car-based structure, likely to work against ZGG achievement.
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Like in the road expansion in Trondheim, compensatory strategies are
being discussed:
There are different ways of solving it, you can […] have a traffic de-
crease in another part of the [region where] you allow for increase [at
the new hospital location at Ullandhaug], but there has to be corre-
sponding reduction in another part of the region. (Employee Norwegian
Public Roads Administration)
While decisions undermining environmental goal achievement are
still being made, an important question is whether the UGA provides a
structure highlighting compensation for such policy. If so, this could
raise the question of transport effects and reduce the number of such
decisions in the future.
5.2.1. Discussion: the dimension of scope
Concerning scope, the analysis shows how some dimensions of land-
use and transport policy are defined as within the UGAs, while others
are outside. The described hospital reallocation and road-expansion
exemplify two large-scale projects seemingly being somewhat outside
the scope of the UGAs. However, the discussions of compensatory
measures shows that they are still attached to the UGAs. This points
towards Rhodes’ (2006) notion of internal accountability of governance
networks, where the differing interests among the partners act as checks
and balances.
Clearly, the UGAs do not function solely as a one-sided tool of na-
tional authorities steering local-level decision making in direction of the
ZGG. Both the hospital and road-capacity projects illustrate state-driven
initiatives likely to undermine the ZGG and particularly in relation to
the latter the reactions from the municipal and county authorities were
strong. Hence, expectations and commitments go both ways: ‘[W]e have
gradually started to think of this as a way and instrument to more strongly
commit the state to be part of what we already agree on [at the municipal
and county levels]’ (Politician, Oslo region). In the renegotiated
Trondheim UGA, there are 20 bullet points describing commitments
for each party, with 5 outlining the state's commitments (Trondheim
UGA, 2019).
Fig. 3. Geographic size of agreement areas.8
8 The new agreement area in the Trondheim region includes the municipality
of Klæbu, which will merge with the municipality of Trondheim on 01/01/
2020.
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5.3. Participation in the UGA: network design
As noted in section 3, Norway's largest urban regions have a history
of cooperating through urban transport packages. These packages' in-
ternal organisation varies in relation to, for example, the number of
municipalities participating and county authorities' role in the network-
governance structure. National authorities have permitted different
models, reflecting how governance modes typically co-evolve with the
dynamics in a city or region (Healey, 2004; Tønnesen, 2015b). At the
UGAs' outset, the national authorities announced that the governance
structure of an already existing Oslo transport package would be the
national model (Ministry of Transport, 2017). However, this instruction
addressed the composition of negotiation and steering groups and es-
tablished the state as leader of the political steering groups (ex-
emplifying hands-on metagovernance; see section 2). The question of
whether there would be a shared model for geographic demarcation of
the UGAs and a similar role for county authorities in representing the
municipalities surrounding the core city was less clear.
All three cases in this paper have representation at the municipal,
county and state levels but still illustrate distinct governance structures.
Our main interest lies in the membership status of the municipalities
constituting the LW region, and more specifically, smaller munici-
palities neighbouring the core city. In the first UGAs, substantial var-
iance in the governance structure was found. In the Trondheim region,
the UGA formally involved only the core municipality; yet, the geo-
graphical area (and number of participating municipalities) was ex-
panded in the second agreement (see Fig. 3). In the Stavanger region,
the municipalities of two bond cities are involved (Stavanger and
Sandnes), followed by two smaller adjacent municipalities. In the Oslo
region, Oslo is currently the only signing municipality, but this UGA
includes 22 surrounding municipalities represented by the Akershus
county authority. While the county authorities are part of all the UGAs,
only in Oslo do they represent municipalities that have not signed the
UGA. This makes both the number of municipalities attached to the
UGA and agreement area larger in the Oslo region.
The UGA's geography matters for both the effectiveness of decision
making and potential for goal alignment. Considering goal alignment, a
state-level informant commented, ‘The issue of geographic demarcation is
also difficult given that the ZGG becomes increasingly hard to obtain as the
area you define increases’, and it has to be achieved for the whole area.
For the Stavanger region, the shared commitment is delineated in the
UGA-document: ‘The [ZGG] shall apply to all municipalities. A possible
growth in person traffic with cars outside the central city areas must be
compensated with equivalent reduction in car traffic from the more densely
populated area’ (UGA Stavanger, 2017, p. 2). Using the Oslo region as
an example, traffic counts show zero growth in traffic in the core city,
but growth in the surrounding county of Akershus (Ministry of
Transport, 2017). If the goal achievement fails due to traffic growth in
neighbouring municipalities, core-city municipalities could end up
having to compensate for this.
Transport patterns are closely related to the LW region character-
istics, implying that transport challenges are not solvable in the core
city and coordinated politics in the wider region are required. Goal
achievement will depend on stringent land-use policy in the wider
urban region to reduce car commuting. Thus, when the first
Trondheim UGA involved only one of the 10 municipalities in the LW
region, it is fair to say that it was limited. In comparison, the Oslo UGA
covers 23 of 30 LW municipalities (Table 1). Moreover, in this area,
more people in the LW region live within the boundaries of the UGA
area compared with the other two regions.
With the renegotiations, changes are occurring. In April 2018, the
government invited UGA renegotiations, with greater focus on in-
cluding the municipalities surrounding the core city. In the Trondheim
region, a new UGA was, as mentioned, signed in March 2019; involving
four municipalities gave the agreement a more regional character (see
Fig. 3). This makes the UGA population closer to that of the LW region
(see Table 1). In the Oslo region, the geographical UGA area will re-
main unchanged, but there is likely to be stronger involvement of the
three municipalities surrounding the core city. This would require them
signing a new UGA following the ongoing negotiations. In the Sta-
vanger region, the geographical UGA area was not expected to change.
However, fuelled by fierce resistance towards a stronger toll-road
scheme (involving congestion pricing), one municipality, Sandnes, is
threatening to leave the UGA arrangement. While having accepted toll-
road funding as part of the first UGA, the re-negotiation process mo-
bilized heavy resistance at the local level. Referring to the first round of
UGA, the mayor of Sandnes stated, ‘Yes, we were part of this, but it was a
mistake. We should never have done it, but we must also dare to turn
around’.11 Seemingly willing to accept a loss of state funding, he pro-
claimed, ‘We will not be part of a UGA involving congestion pricing’.12
While the reasons behind the resistance are multiple, some answers
can be found in the characteristics of the Stavanger region. Stavanger
and Sandnes form a continuous urban area, but the latter has a much
lower population. Moreover, while Stavanger covers 71 km2, Sandnes
comprises a larger area, at 304 km2, with less densely populated urban
settlements. These factors make Sandnes more car based, setting pre-
mises for negotiating land use and transport in governance structures
like the UGA and illustrating reasons for its resistance.
Sandnes' exit would not only have consequences for financing the
UGA but also reduce the UGA's relevance as a tool for addressing mo-
bility in the continuous urban area. The situation illustrates the UGA's
endeavour to include not only the core city but also neighbouring
municipalities. Nevertheless, these factors illustrate how the geography
of UGAs relates not only to complexity of network cooperation; it is also
a fundamental issue with consequences for goal achievement and
ability to address the societal need as intended (to reduce negative
externalities of increasing car usage).
The geography is also relevant regarding resource allocation and
Table 1
Characteristics of the three UGAs.9.
UGA municipalities (number) Municipalities in the LW region (number) UGAs' land area
(km2)
Share population of UGA area of the larger LW-region
population (%)
Oslo 23 30 5372 93.8
Stavanger 4 14 446 (1313) 72.4 (75.2)
Trondheim 4 10 322 (2227) 68.4 (89.9)
Numbers in parentheses describe expected changes after the UGA renegotiations, and in Trondheim, changes following the signing of the new UGA (March 2019).10
9 The definition of the LW region is based on Gundersen and Juvkam (2013).
The population is based on Statistics Norway (2018b), while the built area is
based on Statistics Norway (2017; using two categories: area used for dwellings
and area used for commerce, public and private services).
10 Estimations of changes in land area and per cent population are based on
the municipalities invited to the renegotiation and merging of municipalities
implemented 01/01/2020.
11 Newspaper article in Dagsavisen Rogalands avis, published online (17/08/
2018).
12 Newspaper article on NRK, published online (11/03/2019).
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project planning. The core cities could receive most UGA financing due
to the partial prioritising of resources based on goal-achievement po-
tential. However, this could influence the smaller municipalities' will-
ingness to work under the regime, as noted by a public officer in
Trondheim: ‘No one wants to be part of a committing agreement if they
don't get something back’. The actors need to consider the effectiveness of
each project separately (i.e. how much it supports the ZGG) and si-
multaneously provide smaller municipalities with ‘carrots’ making UGA
participation sufficiently attractive.
5.3.1. Discussion: the dimension of participation
We focussed on the participating municipalities, and to some extent,
the county authorities' role in the UGAs. While initially allowing for
substantial variation, the UGAs are becoming more alike. All the UGAs
seem to be involving three or four signing municipalities, including the
core city and a defined set of surrounding municipalities. In the
Trondheim and Stavanger regions, these municipalities define the
geographical borders pertaining to the ZGG. In contrast, the ZGG area
for the Oslo region is much larger. In addition to four (likely) signing
municipalities, the UGA area will involve 19 municipalities represented
by the county authorities. It is reasonable that the latter will bear less
goal-achievement responsibility and receive fewer resources. Including
the city surroundings, while allocating greater responsibilities and re-
sources closer to the core city, could prove beneficial. At the same time,
a state representative highlighted that there could be benefits of wider
inclusion in the Oslo UGA: ‘[F]rom a professional and principal point of
view, one should perhaps have [included] all the municipalities that form the
continuous urban area and region’.
Wide inclusion in the Oslo region would involve handling more
contextual and geographically based differences of interest. Addressing
the tension between the core city and its outskirts, a central informant
in the Oslo negotiations stated, ‘The interest in the [surrounding] county of
Akershus is […] proportional to the distance to Oslo’. In this sense, the
UGA operates in a well-known political landscape, where enthusiasm
for environmental action is typically stronger in central cities than in
suburban surroundings (e.g. Dierwechter, 2010). However, the re-
negotiation process of the Stavanger region illustrates that a cen-
tre–periphery understanding of implementation challenges is too
simple. While smaller than Stavanger, Sandnes is by no means a small
city in the Norwegian context. Still, the lower density, more spacious
land area and more spread settlements of this municipality set clear
premises for land-use and transport policy. Sandnes' leaving the UGA
would clearly reduce the UGA's general relevance as a tool for solving
urban mobility challenges.
Geographical size and participation relate to a discussion con-
cerning the relationships between network complexity and effective-
ness (see e.g. Sørensen and Torfing, 2009; Vabo et al., 2011; Tønnesen,
2015a). With wider governance structures, although praiseworthy for
numerous reasons, decision making could take longer due to compre-
hensive processes (see section 2). If Sandnes leaves the UGA, tension
may be reduced and decision-making may be more effective. However,
such a UGA would have reduced relevance.
Finally, the UGA negotiations in the Stavanger region exemplify
Marsden et al.’s (2009) ability differences between the municipal-au-
thority players. This study supports these researchers' conclusion of
heterogeneity between municipal-authority players influencing the
dynamics within reward schemes. Understanding and addressing how
implementation barriers vary across the urban region should be a high
priority for national authorities.
6. Conclusion
The aim of this paper was to investigate to what extent the
Norwegian ZGG and UGAs are well-designed and coordinated to pro-
mote climate-friendly transport. Starting from Sørensen and Torfing
(2005) understanding of metagovernance tools, the analysis was
structured using three central dimensions in the metagovernance of
urban contractual agreements: goal operationalisation, scope and parti-
cipation.
Through our analysis, we have found that the ZGG serves a range of
urban challenges concerning mobility. However, the lack of addressing
and monitoring levels of urban freight and heavy vehicles has been
questioned. Meanwhile, in line with goal-setting theory (see Jung,
2012), some of the ZGG's strength lies in how understandable and
manageable relevant actors find it. Ensuring that the goal is not too
wide is part of this. Further, a strength of how the ZGG is oper-
ationalised lies in the degree of local flexibility in adapting packages of
policy measures. Yet, while flexible at the outset, the UGA actors are
expected to adjust the strategies if indicators point to a lack of ZGG
achievement. It remains to be seen how such situations will be handled.
One measure which in practice has not been optional is the im-
plementation of stronger toll-road schemes. Without these, it would be
very difficult for the municipal and county partners to contribute with
‘their 50% share’ of the UGA financing. For the Stavanger region, where
the highest tension is observed, the issue of local decision-making
power over toll-road schemes has been at the heart of the UGA re-
sistance. This feeds into a more general discussion on the degree of state
influence on local-level decision making (see e.g. Bouckaert and
Kuhlmann, 2016).
The current research confirms the importance of clear national
targets and frameworks (see e.g. Bache et al., 2015): There seems to be
a certain shared understanding among relevant actors of the ZGG and
how the UGAs are intended to serve it. Less prevalent is an under-
standing of local implementation barriers. The involved actors would
likely benefit from a greater understanding of how ability differences
between municipalities affect decision making in reward schemes and
how to handle this (cf. Marsden et al., 2009). Particularly in the Sta-
vanger region, the UGA structure is shaky due to divergent views on
toll-road payment. Further, the region illustrates how ability differences
between municipalities do not necessarily follow a traditional cen-
tre–periphery pattern. The municipality in which where most toll-road
resistance is found, is by no means a small outskirt municipality. Hence,
the study shows how varying land-use and transport characteristics
between municipalities partly explain their ability differences and dif-
fering implementation barriers for new toll-road schemes. Since GHG
emissions is a regional issue, there is a need for strong regional gov-
ernance institutions (cf. Dierwechter and Wessells, 2013). Should
Sandnes leave the UGA, its relevance would be reduced: It is in the
regional ambition of the UGAs that some of its greatest potentials are
found. The ZGG is not a goal to be reached in only some ambitious core-
city municipalities; instead, it addresses the urban region level via in-
termunicipal and multilevel cooperation.
The UGA structure fits with the observed restructuring of the state
and creation of new state spaces in urban sustainability (Hodson and
Marvin, 2009; Bulkeley and C Broto, 2013). State financing and pro-
spects of new urban futures are launched, while the state operates at the
fringes of the local-policy sphere. The UGAs' clearly targeted but
somehow open and still not fully institutionalised way of working is an
experimental approach by which the state seeks to motivate and co-
ordinate the actions across government levels. Based upon our analysis,
we conclude that the approach seems promising for the development of
new, locally and regionally grounded approaches to achieving ambi-
tious policy goals. While previous research focussed on experimentation
as a key aspect of governance capacity at the urban level (see e.g.
Bulkeley et al., 2015), our study highlights how the state can work with
experimentation through metagovernance. Analysing the ways in
which the UGAs are metagoverned provides insight into the power,
context, resources and legitimacy of Norwegian urban policymaking
(cf. Marsden and Reardon, 2017). Hence, the focus on ‘realities on the
ground’ has highlighted the struggles over defining what urban sus-
tainability entails (Bulkeley and Betsill, 2005). Here, a second strength
of the UGAs is evident: The way in which the partners discuss how to
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avoid falling short of the ZGG and what to do if this occurs indicates
that the ZGG goes beyond symbolic meta-policy, i.e. policy lacking
substantive action on the ground. Therefore, the UGA could become the
crucial intervening stage, giving the ZGG teeth (cf. Bache et al., 2015).
For example, the railroad improvements in the Trondheim region seems
to have gained momentum by working as a compensatory measure for a
state's road-capacity expansion project. If the UGAs create a de facto
sense of shared commitment and equality, this will promote climate-
friendly transport. This does not obscure that the parties have, and
should have, different roles and powers in the Norwegian planning and
decision-making system. Instead, it points towards the UGAs becoming
a governance arena with internal accountability, where differing in-
terests among the partners act as checks and balances (c.f. Rhodes,
2006).
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